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1 Sanchez Valencia's Natural Logic 
1 . 1  Semantic vs . Deductive Treatments of Inference 
For better or for worse, most of the large body of research on natural lan­
guage semantics done in the past two decades has employed semantic (model­
theoretic) methods but has ignored deduction. Of course, deductive and se­
mantic analysis of the same ' logic' have long been viewed as intrinsically com­
plementary methods by logicians, for well-known reasons. It is also a truism 
that humans do not carry anything analogous to infinite sets of possible worlds 
or situations around in their heads, so the study of deduction-inferential 
relations based on syntactic properties of some kind of "representations" of 
denotations-are potentially of relevance to the psychology of language and to 
computational processing of meaning in a way that model-theoretic semantics 
alone is not . 
The construction of deductive systems is sometimes said to involve "making 
certain semantic distinctions visible in the syntax" , i .e .  as syntactic properties 
that deductive rules can be made sensitive to. For example, consider the typed 
lambda calculus; though our semantics comprehends all possible operations of 
types (t, t) and ( ( t ,  t ) ,  t) ( i .e. truth-functions) already, it is only by allowing de­
ductive rules to single out "', 1\, V, -, etc. syntactically that we can formulate 
the deductive rules of the propositional calculus. 
But exactly which semantic distinctions are relevant? Many alternatives 
are possible, depending on our goals, and many semantic distinctions do not 
seem to be of broad relevance for any goal (e.g. that between different individ­
ual predicates, like horse vs. cow ) . From the beginnings of the history of logic 
( and particularly with Leibniz) ,  up through the recent past (the generative 
semanticists ) ,  and present , one pervasive goal has been the construction of a 
NATURAL LOGIC , one which permits the description of the most important 
common and important inferences of natural language, in terms of syntac­
tic forms which have as much formal similarity to natural language sentences 
as possible ( and/or as much justification as abstract "logical forms" in an 
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empirical linguistic theory as possible) . Without accepting the very strong 
assumption of the generative semanticists-that there is a unique Natural 
Logic that captures all and only the linguistically expressible valid inferences 
( Lakoff 1972)-one can still agree that there is interest in studying deductive 
systems which approximate the class of common linguistic inferences to some 
interest ing degree or in  some interesting way. 
1 . 2  The Linguistic S ignificance of Upward and Down­
ward Monotone Inferences 
Jack Hoeksema ( 1986) ,  Johan van Benthem ( 1 99 1 ) ,  and Victor Sanchez Valen­
cia ( 1 991 ) have all called attention to the significance and prevalence of upward 
and downward monotone inference patterns in natural language inference. ( I  
henceforth write "TM" for 'upward monotone' and "1M" for 'downward mono­
tone' . )  Some examples from Hoeksema involving lexical hyponyms are in ( 1 )  
( T M  contexts ) and (2)  ( ! M  contexts ) :  
( 1 )  X A Y Nina has a bulldog 
A < B bulldog < dog 
X B Y Nina has a dog 
Aldo kissed Nina 
kiss < touch 
Aldo touched Nina 
( 2 )  X A Y She didn't give him a flower Every carp is a fish 
A > B flower > rose carp > koi 
X B Y She didn't give him a rose Every koi is a fish 
In his PhD thesis, Sanchez Valencia ( 1 99 1 )  observes that the numerous rules 
of traditional Aristotelian Syllogistic, which is a logic based on common nouns 
and on verb phrases , can all be viewed as either as ( i )  an inference replac­
ing one predicate with another denoting a superset of the first , in one class 
of environments-the TM ones ; or else as ( i i )  an inference replacing a predicate 
with another denoting a subset of the first , in a different class of environments­
the 1 M  ones . In the rules for the propositional logic of C .S .  Pierce, on the other 
hand,  Sanchez points out that the following two rules are also in effect TM and 
1M inferences : (i) substituting one formula for another (when these stand in a 
conditional relationship) in a formula where the first is within the scope of an 
even number of negations (including of course zero negations)-modus ponens 
and transitivity are two instances of this rule; and (ii) a similar substitution 
with the converse conditional relationship in a context where the replaced for­
mula is in the scope of an odd number of negations-a rule having modus 
tollens as an instance. (Sanchez also investigates some less than successful 
attempts to build general monotonicity rules into a logic made by De Morgan, 
Leibnitz and Ockham. )  
1 . 3 1 M  vs . 1 M  Contexts and Existence Entailments 
Before going on to Sanchez ' system itself, I might mention two other lin­
guistically significant manifestations of monotonicity differentiation in natural 
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language semantics .  
One is the now very familiar observation by Ladusaw ( 1 979) that negative 
polari ty i tems in English and many languages are (with certain pragmatically­
governed exceptions) limited to LM contexts. 
Another interesting linguistic correlation with monotonicity, not pointed 
out explicitly as such apparently, involves differential existence entailments 
from NPs and their relationship to anaphoric possibilities . It is easy to show 
that : if Det is a determiner that is jM or non-monotone for both its restriction 
argument (R) and nuclear scope argument (NS) ,  and 4> is an jM or non­
monotone context (formal characterizations of these monotonicity notions can 
be given in the system presented below) , then 
4>( Det (R) ( NS) )  entai ls (except in one trivial case) 1  R n NS :f:.  0 
However, if ( i )  Det is LM for either its R or NS argument , and 4> is an jM 
context , or (i i ) Det is jM (or non-monotone) and 4> is a LM context , then 
4>(Det (R) (NS ) )  never entails R n NS :f:. 0 
( and in the case of the Det no, entails in fact that R nNS = 0 . )  
Thus for example, Sam baked some (many, several, a t  least a dozen, etc.) 
brownies yesterday entails that there is a non-empty intersection between the 
set of brownies and the set of things Sam baked yesterday, while all of Sam 
didn 't bake brownies yesterday. Sam didn 't bake any brownies yesterday and 
Sam baked no brownies yesterday lack this entailment , entailing in fact that 
this intersection is empty. Given this observation, it makes sense to enter­
tain the following DISCOURSE ANAPHORA HYPOTHESIS : The prototypical 
( "core" ) cases of discourse anaphora are those where a pronoun refers to a set 
(possibly singleton) entailed to exist by a previous sentence in accord with the 
afore-mentioned principle for jM versus LM determiners and contexts ,  where 
Det (R) (NS) corresponds to the "linguistic antecedent" of the pronoun .  Call 
such cases SEMANTICALLY ENTAILED DISCOURSE REFERENTS . It follows from 
the above observation that there can be no semantically entailed discourse ref­
erents with L M  Deis (or other Dets in sentential LM contexts ) .  So for example, 
definite discourse anaphora is possible in (3a) but not (3b)  or (3c) :  
( 3 )  a .  Sam baked some brownies yesterday. They were delicious. 
b. Sam didn 't bake brownies yesterday/Sam didn't bake any brownies 
yesterday. *They were delicious. 
c. Sam baked no brownies yesterday. *They were delicious . 
To be sure, not all cases of "discourse reference" involve semantically entailed 
discourse referents as characterized above; such reference is possible when 
contextual informa.tion or pragmatic reasoning of various kinds often allows 
l This case is the hypothetical determiner 'zero or more' ,  mentioned on occasion by Ed 
Keenan. 
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a hearer to infer a non-empty intersection of R and NS and thus a discourse 
antecedent . The determiners every and few are logically consistent with both 
empty and non-empty intersections. To see an example, consider first "exis­
tential import" , the inference that in every(R) (NS) ,  this intersection is  non­
empty - now generally accepted to be a pragmatic  rather than logical infer­
ence. Such cases naturally lead to acceptable discourses like Every first-year 
student; in the department came to my party last night. TheYi left earlier than 
the other students, though. If such an existential import implicature i s  can­
celed in one way or another , then anaphora is no longer possible. Although a 
great variety of cases of pragmatically "assisted" anaphora undoubtedly exist, 
too varied to survey here (see Dowty 1 993, to appear for some discussion) ,  
it does seem that when all contextual and pragmatic factors are carefully ex­
cluded , the above principle correctly delimits the cases where definite discourse 
anaphora is possible. 2 
1 .4 C ross- Categorial D efinit ion of Monotonicity 
Sanchez Valencia's own monotonicity logic, which can be sketched only briefly 
here, is based on a version of the Lambek calculus (a kind of highly general 
categorial grammar) .  He begins by defining ( recursively) a partial ordering 
among denotations of each logical type ( Sanchez 1 99 1 :67-94, 95- 1 00 )  
(4) a. If c, d E De, then c :5e d iff c = d. 
b .  If c, d E Dt . then c :5t d iff c = 0 or d = 1 ( i .e . , :5t i s  the truth table 
for "-+" ,  or 'less-than-or-equal-to' on the set {0 , 1 } ) .  
c .  I f  c .  d E D(" ,�) , then c :5 (",�) d i ff  for each a E D" ,  c(a) :5� d(a) . 
For example, for expressions of type ( e ,  t ) ,  i .e .  sets ,  it follows from (4)  that 
a :5( e, t )  b means that a is a subset of b. If p and q are formulas , p :5t  q is the 
same as (p -+ q ) .  
The second step i s  to  define upward and downward monotonicity across all 
types in terms of this ordering (Sanchez 1991 : 1 0 1 ) :  
( 5 ) a. A function z E D(",�) is UPWARD MONOTONE iff for every x ,  y E D" , 
x :5", y entails z (x) :5� z (y ) .  
h .  A function z E D(",,� )  i s  DOWNWARD MONOTONE iff  for every x ,  y E 
D"" x :5", y entails z (y ) :5/3 z (x ) .  
c .  A function z E D(",,�) is NON-MONOTONE iff  i t  is neither upward 
monotone nor downward monotone. 
2This is not to deny however that a fairly complex theory, such as Discourse Represen­
tation Theory, is well-motivated, in order to subsume more unusual discourse phenomena 
such as modal subordination (Roberts 1989) and sentence- internal anaphora such as bound 
variable anaphora of both regular and donkey varieties; rather, the point is that it is the fact 
of semantically-entailed reference that makes basic discourse anaphora for quantificational 
antecedents possible at all .  
. 
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A function which is T M  is thus one which preserves the relative ordering of 
any two of its arguments (in their own domain) in the relative ordering of 
the respective values it maps these arguments into (in their domain) .  A tM 
function , by contrast , maps arguments into values which are ordered in the 
opposite way from the arguments .  Hence TM functions are also known as 
M O NOTONICITY - P RES E RVING functions, while tM functions are also known 
as M O N OTONICITY- REVERSING functions, a terminology which we will find 
useful later on . 
To illustrate with some linguistic examples : in the garden is TM in 
« e , t ) ,  ( e ,  t ) )  (predicate modifiers denotations) because [dance] :5 [moves] , 
and "Sam [dances in the garden]" entails "Sam [moves in the garden]" (and, 
crucially, for ALL predicates 0: and /3 such that [0:] :5 [/3] , "Sam [0: in the gar­
den)" entails "Sam [/3 in the garden] ." However, didn't is tM in «e, t ) ,  ( e ,  t ) ) ,  
because "Sue [didn't move]" entails "Sue [didn't dance]" (and similarly for 
other predicate pairs) .  without is !M in «e, t ) , « e , t ) , (e , t ) ) ) ,  since "Sam 
talked [without moving] " entails "Sam talked [without dancing]" ,  etc. 
1 . 5  Lexical Monotonicity Marking 
Since basic expressions differ with respect to their monotonicity entailments 
(for example some vs. every vs . no differ, as is familiar from both general­
ized quantifier and Ladusaw's work on polarity items) ,  it is necessary to have 
such items entered as basic expressions in categories which are somehow syn­
tactically distinct . Sanchez ( 1991 : 1 10) thus introduces new logical types for 
functor expressions which are TM (respectively !M) for their arguments :  
(6)  If  (0: , /3 )  is a category, then (0:+ , /3) and (0:- , /3) are also categories. 
(The 'plain'  category (0: , /3 )  remains a well-formed category name alongside 
the other two; it is the category of non-monotone functors . )  
A reasonable assignment of lexical determiners to  such categories (here, as 
functions from sets to functions from sets to truth values) would thus be as 
follows : 
( 7 )  a(n)  is assigned to: 
every i s  assigned to: 
no is assigned to: 
« e ,  t )+ ,  « e ,  t )+ ,  t ) )  
«e , t ) - , «e , t )+ , t ) )  
« e , t ) - , « e , t ) - , t ) )  
Such lexical monotonici ty assignments do not of course suffice to  correctly 
predict the inferences that can be drawn in all sentences, of course. The above 
type for a(n) would, for example, predict TM inferences for both Restriction 
and Nuclear Scope arguments ,  and this is correct for some cases (e.g. that from 
An armadillo danced one can infer both An animal danced and An armadillo 
moved ) .  We do not however get a TM inference from the noun armadillo in Sam 
didn 't catch an armadillo but instead !M inferences such as Sam didn't catch 
a female animal. Similarly, from Sue sang without catching every armadillo 
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we get not an 1M inferences from this same noun but jM inferences such as 
Sue sang without catching every animal. Obviously, compositional rules are 
required which take account of the monotonicity effects of other functors in 
the sentence. 
1 . 6  Step II: External Monotonicity Marking: 
Two more steps are employed, the first of which is (EXTERNAL) MONOTONIC­
ITY MARKING (Sanchez 199 1 : 1 10)3 , which adds ' + ' and ' - '  to functor and 
argument nodes in a derivation tree: 
( 8 )  (0:, {3) 0: (0:+ , {3) 0: 
(0: , {3 )  0: ==> + (0:+ , {3) 0: ==> + + 
{3 {3 {3 {3 
(0:- , {3) 0: 
(0:- , {3) 0: ==> + 
{3 {3 
To make this and the next step intuitive without going into details , it 
will help to look at examples . For purposes of this paper, I will use skele­
ton deri vations of English sentences, using only logical types like ( ( e, t ) ,  t) as 
categories , whereas a linguistically adequate categorial grammar would enrich 
these with numerous syntactic features (as in HPSG) : the reader may imagine 
these as added . Of the various ways of treating quantificational noun phrases 
in object posi tion that have been proposed in the recent categorial literature, 
I will adopt the method of treating such NPs as functors which combine with 
transitive verbs to form ( intransitive) verb phrases; though this "duplicates" 
determiners as well as NPs in different object and subject categories, it per­
mits me to use simpler derivation trees . The reader who is not familiar with 
this approach is asked to take it on faith that the assignments of "+" and 
"-"  for the object-category determiners are the appropriate one, given the 
subject-determiner assignments in (7 ) .  Finally, I will ignore the problem of 
accounting formally for correct word order; functors will sometimes be placed 
to the left of their arguments, sometimes to the right , as needed for English 
word order . Here then is one derivation before and after the Monotonicity 
Marking Rules have been applied ( (9 )  vs. ( 1 0 ) ) ,  and another derivation shown 
after Marking, ( l l ) :  
3 Again,  a number of complications are ignored here; for example, this and the next 
definition are actually more complex because the Lambek calculus is used, which allows also 
withdrawal of terms; also, the semantics of monotonicity in the lambda calculus must be 
treated . because of its use in interpreting withdrawal of Lambek terms 
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every caught 
( e , ( e , t ) ) ( ( e , t ) - , ( ( e , ( e , t » + , ( e , t » ) 
( ( e ,  (e ,  t » + ,  ( e ,  t »  
( e , t )  
armadillo 
( e ,  t )  
( 1 0 ) Sue caught every armadillo 
( ( e , t ) ,  t )  ( e , ( e ,  t »  ( ( e ,  t )  , ( ( e ,  ( e ,  t » + ,  ( e ,  t ) ) )  ( e , t )  
+ 
( ( e ,  (e ,  t » + ,  ( e ,  t »  
+ + 
( e, t ) 
+ + 
t 
( 1 1 )  
Sam didn't catch every armadillo 
( ( e ,  t ) ,  t )  ( ( e ,  t )  , ( e ,  t » )  ( e , ( e ,  t » 
+ 
+ 
( e , t ) 
+ + 
..,...,( (�e ,--'t )-r+--" (-,-( e-', (�e,'::""t )-,-) +�, -'-( e-, t�) )�) ( e ,  t )  
( e , t ) 
+ 
( ( e ,  ( e , t » + ,  ( e, t »  
+ 
1 .  7 Step III:  Determining the Polarity of Each Con­
stit uent 
To determine the actual direction of inference (1M, tM, or neither) for each 
constituent requires a third step , called POLARITY DETERMINATION , which is 
accomplished by these rules: 
( 1 2 )  If D is  a syntactic derivation (tree) with root node a ,  then: 
a, A node I has polarity in D iff all the nodes in the path from I to a 
are marked, and 
b ,  a node I is POSITIVE iff I has polarity and if the number of nodes in 
this path marked by ' - '  is even. 
c. a node I is NEGATIVE iff I has polarity and if the number of nodes 
in this path marked by ' - '  is odd. 
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( Some nodes will fail to have a polarity, viz . ,  those that are in the scope of a 
non-monotone function ; I will ignore non-monotone functors in the rest of this 
paper, for the sake of brevity. ) 
The polarities derived by these rules for the two previous examples can 
be i l lustrated in the P O LARITY S U M MARIES ( 1 3 )  and ( 14) : these indicate the 
polarity of each word and constituent determined by the rules : 
( 1 3 ) Sue+ ( caught+ ( every+ ( armadillo- )+ ) + ) +  
( 14 )  Sam+ ( didn't+ ( catch - ( every- ( armadillo+ ) - ) - ) + )  
In ( 13 )  for example , armadillo i s  marked with polarity ' - '  because there is 
one ' - '  in the path from this word to the root in the derivation ( 10 ) ,  while 
this same word is marked '+' in ( 14) ,  because the path to the root in ( 1 1 ) 
contains two ' - '  signs;  both the constituents every armadillo and catch every 
armadillo have one ' - '  sign in their paths in ( l l ) ,  hence are marked negative 
in ( 1 4 ) . 
The rules of inference for this logic (which are proved by Sanchez to be valid 
for the semantics associated with the system) are the following, where "occurs 
positively/negatively" means of course positively (or negatively) according to 
the polarity determination defined as above:4 
( 15)  liVhere expression M occurs positively in derivation N(M) : 
[M] � [Ml N(M)  
N(M') 
Where expression M' occurs negatively in derivation N(M' ) :  
[M] < [Ml N(M') 
N (M)  
2 An alternative formulat ion of Sanchez ' 
Monotonicity Logic 
Although the format of Sanchez ' deductive system (and a similar, less detailed 
one in van Benthem 1 991 )  is no doubt highly appropriate for the logical studies 
he developed it for,  it is unsuited to the linguistics applications I am interested 
in. First , it involves three separate steps (syntactic derivation, monotonicity 
marking, polarity determinations) , which would results in a rather indirect 
linking between logic and negative polarity licensing. Second,  notice that the 
4 Although "(M] ::; [M1" is, strictly speaking, a meta-language semantic statement rather 
than an object-language formula. it can as far as I can see be replaced by an object-language 
formula schema [", (M, M') ,  meaning the denotation of M (of category a) is included in that 
of M' , a notation that Sanchez himself uses, though as an abbreviation; cf. p. 125. 
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symbols " +" and "-"  have a different significance in monotonicity-marked tree 
from that in polarity summary (e .g .  a constituent can have a "+" monotonicity 
mark but a "-" polarity, or vice versa) . 
I will at this point present an alternative formulation , which I believe is 
almost certainly equi valent to Sanchez' ( though I do not have a proof of this 
at present ) .  The goal is to "collapse" the independent steps of Monotonicity 
Marking and Polarity Determination into the syntactic derivation itself, so 
that words and constituents are are generated with the markings already in 
place that they would receive in Sanchz' polarity summaries. The symbols 
"+" and "-"  will be used, unambiguously, only to indicate the (final) logical 
polarity. 
The following types will be employed, and here I now introduce rudimen­
tary syntactic category distinctions which go beyond logical types, namely the 
familiar categorial grammar symbols S ,  NP, eN, etc . :  
( 16 )  a .  NP ( = type e ) ,  S (= type i ) ,  and eN (= type ( e , i ) )  are (primitive) 
categories. 
b.  If A and B are any categories , so is AlB. 
c .  If AlB is a category, so are A+ I B+ , A+ I B- , A-I B+ , and A- IB-.  
d .  Parallel definitions to be given for left-leaning-slash categories B\A 
( functor combining with B to  yield A) . 5  
We will in addition need to invoke polarity marking on complex categories 
themselves , e.g. ( N  P\S)+ vs .  (N  P\S)- . It turns out , however, that we do 
not really need to define these separately as categoriesj rather, it suffices to let 
the +1- value of the result-category of the functor indicate the +1- of the 
functor as a wholej6 thus we can use the following as a notational abbreviation: 
( 1 7) (AIB)+ =def (A+IB)+ =def (A+IB) 
(A/B)- =def (A-/B)- =def (A- IB) 
Since one and the same word (or constituent ) can appear with positive polarity 
in one derivation and negative polarity in another (d. caich and armadillo in 
the examples above) ,  most lexical items will , in this formulation , be entered 
in two categories , a "+" -marked category and its "-"-marked counterpart 
(e.g. catch E (NP+ \S+ )/NP+ and catch E (NP- \S- )/NP- ) , though with 
the same semantic interpretation in each case. TM and �M functors also appear 
5NB B\A will not, as in some notational usages, indicate a functor seeking an A on the 
left to form a B .  
6The reason this i s  possible i s  that , as Hoeksema ( 1986) observes, and Sanchez proves, 
in a function-argument combination the function expression always has the same polarity 
as the combination as a whole (while the polarity of the argument expression, on the other 
hand,  depends on whether the particular function is an TM or 1M one) ; this is in fact the 
motivation for "+" invariably assigned to the function expressions in the Marking rules in 
(8)-note that a "+" at the step of Monotonicity Marking results in polarity preservation 
in the ultimate polarity determination,  not necessarily positive polarity per se. 
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in two categories . but now the terms "preserving" and "reversing" are more 
appropriate: 
( 1 8 )  a. Lexical items in general appear in both a "+"-marked and a "-"­
marked category though with the same interpretation. 
b. jM functors (= MONOTONICITY PRESERVING FUNCTORS ) appear in 
a pai r  of categories of the forms A+ I B+ and A- I B- . 
c. LM functors ( = MONOTONICITY REVERSING FUNCTORS ) appear in 
a pair  of categories of the forms A + I B- and A- I B+ . 
The categorial S lash-Eliminat ion rules (or "Functional Application" Rules) 
must appropriately respect +1- marking: 
( 1 9 )  Polarity-Preserv . I-Elimin . :  (20)  Polarity-Revers . 1-Elimin. : 
A+ IB+ B+ A+IB- B-
IE IE 
A+ A+ 
A-IB- B- A-IB+ B+ 
IE IE 
A- A-
Rather that literally specify the four separate rules indicated above however, 
we might regard "+" and "-"  as syntactic features , as features are treated 
elsewhere in linguistics (but here with deductive significance) , and these four 
rules would be simply instances of a single slash-elimination schema, where A 
and B are variables for complexes of syntactic  features : 
( 2 1 ) AlB B 
-- IE 
A 
For various purposes ( cf. below) ,  one might want to adopt a notation for 
category schemas of the preserving and reversing categories, insofar as the 
same expressions appear in both members of such pairs: 
(22) a. AlpB =def {A+IB+ , A- IB- } 
b .  AIRB =def {A+IB- , A-IB+ } 
To complete this reformulation of Sanchez' system, we need a final defini­
tion: a grammar as defined so far will generate sentences of the two subcate­
gories S+ and S- , but it is only the former which should count as independent 
sentences ( though the latter is also needed , for clauses embedded inside LM 
functions) 
(23) If if> i s  of category S+ ,  if> is a well-formed (non-embedded) sentence. 
123 
124 David Dowty 
Here are the category assignments we would make for determiners in this 
system: ( "VP" is used as an abbreviation for (NP\S) . )  
( 24 ) { (S+ IV P+ )ICN+ } (SlpVP)lpCN a is assigned to: (S-IV P- )ICN-
every is assigned to: { (S+ IV P+ )ICN- } (SlpVP)IRCN (S-IV P- ) ICN+ 
no is assigned to: { (S+IVP- )ICN- } = (SIRVP)IRCN (S-IVP+ )ICN+ 
As direct object quantificational NPs are treated here as functions from tran­
sitive verbs (category (NP\S)INP, abbreviated VPINP or simply TV) to 
V P ) ,  each determiner in category (SOt IV p!3)/C N""( above is assumed to have 
an object-NP counterpart in (TV!3\VPOt )/CN""( .  Once again, the operation of 
the system is best understood through a few simple examples : 
(25)  
caught 
Sue VP+ INP+ 
S+IVP+ 
S+ 
every armadillo 
(TV+\ V P+ )ICN- CN-
TV+\VP+ 
If a sentence is well-formed, it must be derivable in category S+ , so we can use 
an informal procedure analogous to Genzen-Sequent Parsing ( cf. Moortgat 
1 99 1 )  to determine what polarity marking must appear on each category. So 
in (25 ) ,  Sue is the main functor , and as it is polarity-preserving, i t  will  appear 
only in the categories S+ IV P+ and S-IV P- . Of these, only the former could 
result in an S+ , so that is the category for Sue .  This implies in turn that 
the V P is marked V P+ , else it could not combine with S+ IV p+ . The verb 
catch is a monotonicity-preserving function, and if it had had a simple N P 
ob ject , we could deduce it must be marked V P+ IN P+ by parallel reasoning. 
Instead, i t  is the argument of the quantificational NP functor, but it turns 
out that all object NPs in every will be monotone-preserving, hence of either 
TV+ \ V P+ or TV- \ V P- , but again only the former could result in V P+ 
after combining with an argument , so this determines both the category of the 
object N P and of the verb, TV+ IN P+ . Given the lexical choices for object 
every ,  (TV+ \ V P+ ) I C N- and (TV- \ V P- ) I C N+ , only the former gives the 
needed result category, thus fixing the polarity for it and also determining 
that the C N argument of every appears in C N- . Thus there is a unique 
polarity assignment possible for this example , marked straightforwardly in the 
derivation tree, and it is in fact the same as the one determined by Sanchez' 
method in ( 9 )  and ( 1 3 ) .  
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The next example adds a polarity reversing auxiliary verb didn't , which 
wi l l  be entered in categories V P+ IV P- and V P- IV P+ . In order for the 
whole \/ P didn 't catch every armadillo to be in V P+ here, the V P argument 
of didn 't must be in V P- , thus the words and sub-constituents of catch every 
armadillo must have the opposite of their polarities in ( 25) : 
(26)  
didn't 
Sam 
S+IVP+ 
S+ 
catch 
VP+ 
every armadillo 
(TV- \ VP- )/CN+ CN+ 
TV- \VP-
3 NPIs and Negative Concord as Facilitating 
Inference Processing by Overtly Marking 
1M Context s 
From the extensive body of recent research on the many manifestations of 
negative polarity and concord , it appears such words and phrases have vari­
ous historical sources (e.g. first as denoting 'minimal amounts' ,  then as NPls 
via conventionalization or lexicalization of the "pragmatic scales" first de­
scribed by Fauconnier) and serve various functions for speakers (e.g. a means 
of 'strengthening' negation syntactically, or lending vividness, etc . )  The main 
hypothesis of this paper is that another, very important function of these items 
has been overlooked: 
( 2 i l  Hypothesis :  Given that ( i )  TM and 1M inferences are a very significant 
pattern of natural language reasoning, and (i i) the distribution of NPls 
( and NC)  is (almost) coextensive with logically 1M contexts ,  we can 
hypothesize that one important reason for the existence of NPI and NC 
marking is to  directly mark positions syntactically which are subject to  
1M inferences . 
Another way of viewing this hypothesis is as suggesting that this direct mor­
phological marking of 1M positions, also a way of "making certain semantic 
distinctions visible in the synta.x" , may in effect provide the natural language 
hearer with a "shortcut" to Monotonicity Inferences . 
( 28 )  a. NPI RULE :  I f  expression M occurs as the argument of a NPI Q in  
derivation N(M) .  then: 
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• An inference to N (M/) is val id ,  where [M/] � [M] 
• An inference to N(M/)  is not valid, where [M] � [M/] 
b. DEFAULT RULE : 7 If expression M occurs as the argument of a ( lexi­
cal) expression 0: in derivation N (M) ,  where 0: is not an NPI  but is a 
member of a lexical category which has NPls as members, then: 
• An inference to N (M/ )  is valid ,  where [M] � [M/] 
• An inference to N (M' )  is not valid, where [M/] � [M] 
Recalling our earlier observation about 1M NPs and existence entailments,  
a further processing role for noun phrase NPls ( any eN, anybody, etc. ) can 
be suggested: since we have observed that there is no possible semantically­
entailed discourse referent for a quantificational NP with 1M Det (or otherwise 
in a 1M context ) ,  the occurrence of a NPI-marked noun phrase may immedi­
ately tell the hearer, in advance of understanding a whole clause composition­
ally, that there is no possible semantically entailed discourse referent for that 
NP. ( Again, contextually or pragmatically "assisted" discourse reference is to 
be excepted. )  
3 . 1  Using a Monotonicity-Based Deductive System to 
D escribe NPI and N C  distribution 
Since a monotonicity-based deductive system involves treating jM and 1M 
properties as syntactic properties , the possibility of describing natural lan­
guage NPI and NC (Negative Concord) distribution directly in terms of a logic 
like the preceding one naturally suggests itself. In an earlier paper (Dowty 
1 99 :3 ) .  I constructed such an analysis on the original Sanchez formulation with 
its three-step polarity determination. As a consequence of the indirect way in 
which logical polarity is determined in this version , the licensing of NPls and 
'Rule (28b) is called a default rule because non-monotone contexts also exist, but these 
are relatively rare in natural language (e.g. the scope of quantifiers like exactly ten) ,  with 
1M contexts being by far the most common. 
If NPls and Negative Concord are indeed inference markers, then they are markers of 
default inference in another sense: Ladusaw ( 1 979) observed that it was known that propo­
sitional attitude verbs differ as to whether they license NPls, e.g. Sam believes that Sue 
caught an/any * armadillo (s) vs. Sam doubts that Sue caught any armadillos. and claimed 
that verbs like believe,  know were "upward-entailing" , while those like doubt, regret are 
·'downward-entailing." If we are to identify NPI distribution with logical inference, then this 
must be default inference, not strict logical inference, because of the well-known problem 
that propositional attitude verbs are not really closed under logical consequence. Never­
theless. it is not surprising that N PI distribution should extend to propositional attitude 
clauses (with "!M" verbs like doubt, regret )  if they serve as short-cut inference markers, 
since the cases where natural language speakers DO draw logical inferences from proposi­
t ional attitude sentences ( i .e. they assume the bearer of the reported attitude is rationale, 
suitably attentive, and well-informed in the relevant subject matter) far outnumber cases 
where they conservatively refrain from such inferences. 
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NC was likewise quite indirect : NPls (and 'concordant ' negative morphemes 
in NC languages) were marked with a special syntactic label, and an "output 
filter" was imposed which stated that a derivation was to be considered well­
formed if and only if all labeled morphemes turned out to occur in a logically 
negative context ( i .e. terminated a path to the root of the sentence in which 
there was an odd number of "-"  markings ) . 
In the alternative formulation presented above, syntactic NPI licensing 
can be made much more direct and simple: we can take advantage of the fact 
that lexical expressions here appear in categories "already marked" for logical 
polarity. Up to now, I have assumed each word occurs in both a "+"-marked 
and a "-" -marked category variant , but we now modify this assignment for 
polarity items, both positive polarity items (PPls ) and NPls ,  as follows: 
(29) a. NPls are entered ONLY in "-"-marked categories . 
b. PPIs are entered ONLY in "+"-marked categories .  
The consequence of course is that NPls, unlike words in general ,  can now only 
occur where their logical context is LM,  and PPls where the context is jM.  
Here are some sample category assignments :  
( 30 ) 
a(n) is assigned to:  { (S+ /VP+)/CN+ } (S- /VP- ) /CN-
any is assigned to: (S- /VP- )/CN-
several is assigned to: (S+ /VP+ )/CN+ 
no is assigned to: { (S+ /V  P- ) /CN-(S- /V P+ ) /CN+ } 
once is assigned to: { VP+\VP+ } VP- \VP-
ever is assigned to: VP- /VP-
never is assigned to: { VP-/VP+ } VP+jVP-
A derivation involving a NPI will look like those already shown, 
( 3 1 )  
Sam 
S+/VP+ 
didn't 
catch 
any armadillos 
(TV- \ V P- ) /CN- CN-
TV- \VP-
/E 
-------------------- /E 
VP-
------------------ /E 
VP+ 
----------------- /E 
S+ 
but i f  we attempt to derive a sentence with an unlicensed NPI, the derivation 
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fails because the NPI  does not occur in the "+" -marked category needed to 
complete the derivation ( indicated by "E!7" in ( 32) : 
(32 ) 
caught 
Sue 
S+/VP+ 
S+ 
any armadillos 
(TV6\N P6 )/CN6 CN+ 
TV+\VP+ 
VP+ 
3 . 2  Negative Concord and 1M Marking 
Negative Concord is now reasonably familiar in linguistic studies, not only of 
non-standard English but also Romance languages such as Italian and Catalan; 
the data below is from Ladusaw ( 199 1 , 1992) 
(33 ) a. Nobody said nothing to nobody. [NS English) 
' Nobody said anything to anyone. ' 
b. Maria didn't say nothing to nobody. [NS English) 
'�aria didn 't say anything to anyone. ' 
c. Mario non ha parlato di niente con nessuno . [Italian) 
'Mario hasn't spoken with anyone about anything . '  
d .  No m'ha telefonat ningu. [Catalan) 
'Nobody has telephoned me. '  
Ladusaw sees a dilemma for previous analyses of Negative Concord; these 
essentially amount to treating one of the negatively-marked elements in a 
multiple-negative sentence as semantically potent negation ( the "real nega­
tion" ) ,  and the other negatively marked NP(s )  as plain existential quantifiers. 
(and didn 't as meaning do in ( 33b ) ) .  Two kinds of problems then immediately 
present themselves in getting the distributions of the two kinds of "negative" 
words to work out properly. First , there is no "logical double negation" reading 
for ( 34 ) ,  
(34 ) Mary didn 't talk to nobody. 
'Mary didn't talk to anybody' 
nor indeed are such logical double negation readings usually found in any NC 
languages at all ,  according to Ladusaw, so logically potent negations must 
somehow be limited to one per sentence. Second, the postulation of "posi­
tive" semantic sources for negative morphemes raises the problem of insuring 
that these never surface except where C-commanded by a "real" ( semantically 
negative) negative morpheme. 
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Ladusaw comments on the desirability of linking the description of NC 
w i th a more general t heory that encompasses the licensing of NPls and NC 
in their respective types of language, and I think there is not likely to be any 
disagreement with him on this last point . However, he has qualms about the 
existing ways of carrying out this linking by making the assumption that "neg­
ative" words like nobody in NC languages have the afore-mentioned ambiguity 
between real negations and NPI readings . Specifically: "the theory of negative 
polari ty i tems restricts the distribution of the NPls but does nothing to re­
strict the distribution of the negative expressors (beyond requiring that there 
be one if there are any NPls ) .  In a language which is strictly NC, something 
must be added to restrict the distribution of the negative quantifiers . Oth­
erwise every sentence which contains multiple negative phrases should have 
both a double negation (DN)  and a NC construal" (Ladusaw 1992: 248 ) .  The 
conclusion drawn in that paper is  that the appropriate way to relate NC to 
NPIs i s  that none of the negative phrases in a NC sentence should be regarded 
as "expressing the negation." Rather, all should be viewed as NPIs, with 
the negative meaning itself expressed "constructionally" , i .e. represented as 
an abstract operator in logical form that is  triggered by syntactic rules, not 
by any one morpheme. ( See Ladusaw 1 992 for the complete statement of this 
argument . )  
Under the view of the importance of LM contexts taken here, i t  i s  natural 
to suggest the following approach to N C :  
( 35 ) Negative Concord Language Hypothesis: Given that LM vs. jother po­
sitions are significant for natural language inference, LM positions are 
just as important (if not more so) for a language to indicate syntacti­
cally than "where the negation is" in logical form. Hence some natural 
languages-the NC languages-employ words which are indeterminate 
as to signifying negation itself ( i .e .  are ambiguous between negative and 
NPI  interpretat ions) but these words UNIFORMLY signify LM positions. 
( Here "negation" means a determiner meaning that is anti-additive for both 
arguments ( no ,  none of , cf. Zwarts 1 993 ) or the image of classical negation 
in the relevant Boolean type ( not 5, not VP, etc . ,  but excludes other LM 
functions. ) 
What is interesting is that when this hypothesis is formally implemented, 
the result is that the two features of negative morpheme distribution men­
tioned by Ladusaw follow automatically, as we will see shortly. This is a rather 
striking argument for the relevance of LM inference-marking in NC/NPI phe­
nomena. 
We could if desired soften the unpleasant appearance (for some) of a pos­
tulation of systematic lexical ambiguity, and at the same time emphasize the 
uniform semantic role of these words as LM indicators , by introducing a new 
kind of category schema for them: 
(36 )  Let AH / B- stand for two categories which contain corresponding pairs 
of ( lexical)  items, an expression in A+ / B- with a polarity-reversing 
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( "negative" ) meaning and a homophonous expression in A-I B- with 
polarity-preserving ( "positive" ) meaning. 
To be sure, this would not eliminate the essential systematic ambiguity in­
volved , only give us a way to describe it more methodically. An assignment of 
a representative set of "negative" items to categories in such a system would 
be as follows : 
( 3 7 )  
Word Category 
didn't V pH IV P-
nobody S(- )  IVP-
never V pH IV P-
Equivalent 
Category Set { VP+IVP­
VP- IVP-{ S+IVP­
S-IVP-{ (S+IVP- )/CN­
(S- IV P- )/CN-{ VP+IVP­
VP- IVP-
Respective 
Translations 
APAX [""P(X)) } 
APAX[P(X)) 
APVX [""P(x) ] } 
AP3x [P(x)] 
AQAPVX [Q(x )  - ...,P (x )] } 
AQAP3x[Q(x )  1\ P(x) ]  
APAX[""P(X)] } 
APAX [P(X)) 
(Determiners are still assumed to be assigned to the corresponding object­
position category as well, e.g. for no here, (TV-\VPH)/CN- ) .  
An illustrative derivation i s  i n  (38) : NB nobody appears i n  the reversing 
category S+ IV P- and thus has a "true" negative translation , whereas didn 't 
and no in the respective "NPI" categories VP- IVP- and (TV-\VP- )ICN­
will have NPI-type translations: 
( 38 ) no armadillos 
catch (TV- \VP- )/CN- CN-
IE 
didn't VP-INP- TV- \VP-
IE 
Nobody VP- IVP- VP-
IE 
S+ /VP- VP-
IE 
5+ 
If on the other hand we attempted a derivation in which all "neg" words had 
NPI translations, as in (39 ) ,  it would fail because the one of these with widest 
scope would have a A-I B- category, which could not result in a category S+ 
for the whole sentence (or else only by ignoring the proper matching of "+1 - "  
in  functor and argument ) :  
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( 39 ) no armadillos 
didn't 
catch (TV- \VP- )ICN- CN-
TV- \VP-
-------------------
IE 
Nobody V P- IV P- VP­
------------------
IE 
S- IVP-
----------- * * IE 
IE 
Example (40 ) shows why an attempt at a logical double negation reading 
fai ls , and ( 4 1 )  shows that a derivation also fails which has both a semantically 
negative and NPI-interpreted negatives if the former fails to F-command the 
latter: in both cases , the reason is that a negative-marked word would fail to 
correctly signify a logically 1M context : 
(40 ) no armadillos 
catch (TV- \VP+ )ICN- CN-
IE 
didn't VP-INP- TV- \Vpe 
* * IE 
Sue VP+ IVP- VP-
IE 
S+ IVP+ VP+ 
IE 
S+ 
( 4 1 ) no armadillos 
catch (TV- \VP+ )ICN- CN-
IE 
didn't VP-INP- TV+\VP+ 
* * IE 
Sue VP- IVP- Vpe 
* * IE S+IVP+ Vpe 
IE 
S+ 
In summary, this way of treating Negative Concord ( i .e .  the hypothesis 
that concord marking uniformly indicates 1M context but is indifferent to its 
own negation status) predicts without any further apparatus that : 
• In a "chain" of neg-marked words ,  the one with logically widest scope 
must have a 1M interpretation 
• All other neg-marked words in the chain must have NPI interpretations. 
• ( Consequently, ) no logically double negations are possible. 
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3 . 3  Variations i n  N C  D ialects :  
Ladusaw ( 1 99 1 ,  1 992 )  observes that among negative concord dialects there 
is quite a bit of variation in the positions in which negative morphemes are 
allowed (and the readings produced by them) ;  four variants from American di­
alects ( which turn out to have correspondents among the Romance languages) 
are listed in (42) below. Here, a "* ,, indicates the sentence is ungrammatical, 
a " 1 "  indicates the sentence is grammar on a logically "single negation" read­
ing, and a "2" indicates a sentence which , if grammatical at all , can only be 
interpreted as logical double negation: 
( 42 ) NC-Al NC-A2 NC-B NC-C 
a. No dogs chased Felix 1 1 1 * 
b. No dogs didn't chase Felix * 2 1 * 
c . No dogs didn't chase no cats * 2 1 * 
d .  No dogs chased no cats 1 1 1 * 
e. Fido didn't chase no cats 1 1 1 1 
f. Fido chased no cats * * * * 
The meanings expressed by (a-b) and (c-d) in dialect NC-B are expressed 
instead in dialect NC-C by (f) and (g) respectively: 
(42) g.  Didn't no dogs chase Felix. 
h .  Didn't no dogs chase no cats .  
It turns out that all but one of these dialects can be described in the system 
proposed above by deleting one of the two interpretations (true negation or 
NPI)  of one of the neg-words ; this possibility depends on the fact that subject 
and object NPs (and therefore determiners) belong to separate categories in 
the categorial syntax employed here (an analytic step which does have some 
independent motivation in this syntactic framework , to be sure) . Before it is 
objected too loudly that appeal to varying lexical categorizations may be ad 
hoc and inappropriate. the reader should be reminded that categorial grammar 
is after all a "radical lexicalist" theory (to use Karttunen's famous phrase) ,  
one i n  which all the syntax of the grammar resides i n  the syntactic categories 
and their structure (there are no independent phrase structure rules, except for 
slash elimination itself, and no movement rules or other independent syntactic 
constraints) ,  and only by assignment of lexical items to various categories 
differentially is their behavior differentiated at all; thus this is in fact a rather 
restricted method of describing dialect differences such as those in (41 ) .  
The version of negative concord implicitly described i n  the rules given ear­
lier is a kind of hypothetical , very general one, in that even the sentence-type 
( 0 .  ungrammatical in all American diaiects ,  would be generated. However, 
Ladusaw notes ( 1 992:249, note 1 0 )  that Allesandro Zucchi reported that his 
own dialect of Italian, a NC language, allowed pattern (f) as well as the others. 
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To eliminate sentence pattern (f)  from Dialect NC-B (and from all other 
NC dialects as well-except Zucchi 's  Italian ) ,  it suffices to delete the negative 
interpretations , and of course lexical entries in the syntactic categories for 
these, of non-subject nobody and no, leaving only their NPI interpretations. 
This pattern is also said to be found in Catalan. 
To describe Dialect NC-Ab we need to eliminate sentence types (b )  and 
( c ) , and this is accomplished by deleting the NPI readings of neg-marked 
auxiliaries . The pattern is matched by Spanish and standard Italian . 
As Dialect NC-A2 is described by Ladusaw ( 1991 ) ,  this dialect is supposed 
to allow double-negation readings for (b )  and (c )  patterns (and is otherwise 
like NC-A1 ) ,  but as already noted, the present system predicts that genuine 
double-negation readings are absent from negative-concord languages. Indeed, 
Ladusaw elsewhere ( 1 992) takes the absence of such readings to be a deep 
generalization in need of explanation (also as noted) ,  but if this observation 
of NC-A2 is correct , then no such generalization holds. Such readings are 
perhaps an instance of metalinguistic negation, a possibility suggested by the 
examples of alleged "real" double negation in NC-dialects mentioned briefly by 
Labov ( 1 992 ) .  The negative concord Romance languages definitely do allow 
such readings , it is now well-known,  a problem to which we will return in the 
last section . 
In Dialect NC-C,  a neg-marked NP may not precede a neg-marked aux­
iliary: cf. (a)- ( d) vs. (g) , ( h ) .  To describe this, we delete negative inter­
pretation of subject nobody, no (as well as the negative interpretations of 
auxiliaries deleted for dialect NC-A1 ) ,  and add "inverted" didn't of type 
(S+ I ( S- IV P- ) ) I V  P- ( i .e .  having an interpretation that insures wide scope 
over the subject N P ) .  In other words , in this dialect neg-marked NPs have 
only NPI interpretations and auxiliaries have only negative interpretations ; 
with the assumption that an aux can take scope over a quantificational sub­
ject NP only if it precedes it, the hypothesis that NPI "negatives" consistently 
mark 1M contexts ,  takes care of the rest . 
Before concluding this section, I will mention one interesting argument 
relating to the choice between the present hypothesis and Ladusaw's ( 1 992) 
theory of NC (that neg-marked words in NC languages are always indefinites 
in the sense of Discourse Representation Theory, and that the real logical nega­
tion in a negative sentence is abstract ) .  It has often been observed for English 
( e .g .  in the discussion of "free-choice" any vs. NPI any , cf. Carlson ( 1 981 ) )  
that adverbs like practically, almost, virtually, nearly, absolutely can modify 
universal and (sufficiently large) numerical quantificational NPs, (cf. Almost 
everybody likes him, Practically every teenager adores him, Nearly 1 000 people 
voted for her ) ,  including negative ones ( Absolutely nobody goes there any­
more ) ,  but not indefinites ( cf. * A lmost several people like him, * Absolutely 
most people like him, *Practically a teenager or two like him) .  The same is 
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apparently true in French (practiquement ) ,  according to van der Wouden and 
Zwarts ( 1 993 ) ,  which allows negative concord. They have observed, further­
more, that while such an adverb can modify the first or C-commanding NP in 
a multiply-negated sentence, it cannot modify subsequent neg-marked NPs :  
( 43 )  a .  Pratiquement personne n'a rien dit 
Practically nobody not has nothing said 
'Practically nobody said anything' 
b. *Personne n 'a pratiquement rien dit 
Nobody not has practically nothing said 
This is predicted immediately by analyses in which the C-commanding nega­
tion in a N C sentence is indeed a real logical negation while other neg-marked 
words are NPls, but does not follow (at least, not without further explana­
tion and/or assumptions) in a theory in which all neg-marked words in such 
sentences are semantically indefinites . 
4 "Doubly-Licensed" NPIs : A Problem for 
t he 1M-Inference Hypothesis 
A fact about NPI-licensing which seems to be not widely known, but is I 
believe very significant , is that NPls are acceptable when in the scope of not 
just one but also two or more 1M expressions. Examples where a conditional 
antecedent provides one trigger (44a, 45a) and a second may be added (44b , 
45b ) were cited by Hoeksema ( 1 986) . However, other kinds of cases besides 
conditionals can readily be constructed where a second trigger can be added 
(46,47 ) ,  and Chris Barker has observed the actually occurring example (48 ) :  
(44) a. If he knows anything about logic, he will know Modus Ponens. 
(45)  
(46 ) 
(47) 
b .  If he doesn't know anything about logic, he will (still) know Modus 
Ponens . (Hoeksema, 1986) 
a. If he lifts a finger, fire him. 
b .  I f  he  doesn't lift a finger, fire him. (Hoeksema, 1 986) 
a. She very rarely eats anything at all for lunch. 
b.  She very rarely doesn't eat anything at all for lunch . 
a. No one except John Q. Public pays any income tax (anymore) .  
b .  No one except Leona Helmsley doesn't pay any income tax (at all ) .  
(48) Don't let her die without lifting a finger! (Sign on a video arcade game, 
to encourage the potential customer to rescue the heroine; observed by 
Chris Barker, p . c.) 
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This situation contrasts with that of positive polarity items , where it has been 
known since Baker 's research in the 1 970's that the combination of two 1M 
functors recreates a "positive" environment i n  which PPls are again happy 
( Ladusaw 1 979) : 
(49)  a. I would rather be in Florida right now 
b. ?? I  wouldn't rather be in Florida right now 
c. You can 't convince me I wouldn 't rather be in Florida now. 
In other words , PPls seem to follow the ( logically justified) rule that two 1 M  
functors combine t o  produce a TM context , while NPls d o  not . 
The theory of Ladusaw ( 1 979) is actually constructed so as to predict that 
a N P I  is licensed iff it is in the scope of at least one ( i .e .  thus also of two or 
more) 1M expression(s)  and so is consistent with such data. But insofar as two 
1M expressions combine to yield a TM logical context, that theory therefore 
claims that logical 1M context per se is not the relevant factor for NPI licensing 
( contrary to its usual characterization as a "purely semantic" account of NPI  
licensing context ) .  The theory of this paper implies that logical 1M context 
( relative to the whole sentence in which a word occurs) should always be the 
determining factor, hence does not predict such data. 
A simple conclusion to draw at this point would be that the condition "in 
the s cope of (a) 1M functor(s)" in Ladusaw's ( 1 979) account is the empiri­
cally correct licensing condition, whereas the sentence-based definition of 1M 
context derived from Sanchez's logic i s  not , and that is the end of  the matter. 
However , I believe there are reasons to be less than fully satisfied with this 
position and to give a good deal more thought to the problem. 
This data actually shows that a unique, syntactically-characterized logical 
form for each sentence must be appealed to in Ladusaw's account : a purely 
semantic definition of 1M context will not do, because in pure semantic terms 
there is no distinction between an argument in the scope of no 1M functions 
and one in the scope of exactly two 1M functions, any more than there i s  a 
distinction in the semantic behavior of ¢ vs. -.-.¢ in classical logic .  In order 
to determine whether an NPI is licensed "in terms of a semantic definition 
of downward monotonicity" in a sentence such as that indicated by the tree 
sketched in (50) for example, we must still determine for (the model-theoretic 
interpretation of) each node N1 , N2 , etc .  whether the NPI is licensed with 
respect to that node: if we should happen to skip node Nl and check only N2 
and higher nodes , then the NPI would fail to meet the licensing condition : 
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S 
/ .. . . . . .  . N2 
A 
1M2 Nl 
A 
1Ml NPl 
One illuminating way to see the consequences of this is to consider the Lambek­
calculus , which is "structurally complete" in the sense that if a string is well­
formed on one bracketing, it is well-formed on all possible bracketings and 
would receive the same semantic interpretation on each bracketing (baring 
the complications of non-concatenative operations introducing quantifier scope 
ambiguities , etc . ) .  If however two 1M functions such as 1M2 and 1Ml in a tree 
like the one above were combined by functional composition (i .e .  the Lambek 
equivalent ) before being applied to their argument N P l, then their argument 
would not meet Ladusaw's licensing condition on this derivation. As far as I 
know, this would thus be the only case where alternative Lambek-derivations 
of the same string could have different "semantic" properties. 
This realization also shows that the set of "1M contexts" relevant for NPI 
licensing cannot be so straightforwardly identified on empirical on semantic 
grounds, independently of NPI data, as i s  generally assumed: in fact , speakers 
of natural languages can only identify entailments from full sentences, not from 
"local" subparts of arbitrary full sentences (which is what Ladusaw's account 
would really need) .  So out of a series of sentences ( i )Mary caught every unicorn 
( i i )  Mary didn 't catch every unicorn ( i i i )  It is not the case that Mary caught 
every unicorn ( iv )  It is not the case that Mary didn 't catch every unicorn , our 
intuitions tell us that the eN argument of every only supports 1M inferences 
in ( i )  and (iv ) ,  not (ii) and (iii ) .  Such a superficial 'inconsistency' in empirical 
observation can of course be easily explained in a theory in which the property 
of permitting 1M inference reverses when two 1M functors combine. But i t  
is that theoretical conception of 1M that leads us to the divergence between 
NPI distribution and the theory of 1M context we have observed, since NPls 
would be licensed in this eN argument in all four cases . 
I do not have a solution to this anomaly. It is easy to make speculations 
about the ultimate "explanation" of double licensing, perhaps ones deserving 
investigation : Natural logic might involve intuitionistic rather than classical 
negationS , which would mean in terms of the present logic that we should not 
assume both cancellation rules A + / B- + B- =? A + and A - / B+ + B+ =? A­
but only the former, replacing the latter instead with A - / B-- + B-- =? A - , 
and putting NPIs not only in B- but also B-- , etc. Another possibility is 
8This possibility was in fact suggested to me by Bill Ladusaw (p .c. ) , which is  not to say 
that he advocates it seriously. 
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that the (well-known) sentence processing difficulty of sentences with multiple 
1M contexts ,  together with the relative infrequency of occurrence of such cases 
( and therefore little real need to be able to deal with them "logically" ) led to 
the grammaticization of the "no licensing reversal" rule. Yet another is that 
"local 1M context" -marking serves some useful processing function, perhaps in 
computing an intermediate partial composit ional interpretation of the sentence 
in advance of putting the whole sentence meaning together , a processing having 
no counterpart in deductive systems such as Sanchez ' .  But these are only 
guesses . 
4 . 1  A Double-Marking System for Describing both 
Syntactic and Logical NPI/NC Contexts 
Rather, what I will propose here is a system which simply takes this dis­
crepancy as given . a system which distinguishes LOGICAL POLARITY from 
SYNTACTIC P O L A RITY and computes them in parallel , in the same composi­
t ional way. We will keep the "+ / -" superscripts for logical polarity and add 
subscripts for syntactic polarity: 
(5 1 )  Let the notation: Ap stand for a category A which has (i )  LOGICAL 
polarity Q and (ii) SYNTACTIC polarity {3. 
For example, A: / Bt would be a logical-polarity reverser that also cancels 
NPI  licensing, whereas A: / B: is a logical polarity reverser that preserves 
NPI  licensing, i .e. allows its argument to contain NPls even though it is no 
longer a logically 1M context . 
This double-marking system is not intended as a 'theory' of NPI/NC li­
censing in the proper sense, but a descriptive framework within which to in­
vestigate the interaction of logical and syntactic licensing and to develop a lin­
guistic theory. The goal of and motivation behind such as systems is this: the 
NPI-as-inference-marker hypothesis predicts that logical and syntactic mark­
ing should ideally coincide, so divergences should be the exception (as they 
apparently are) .  When the two DO diverge, under exactly what conditions 
does this happen, and, what explanations for the divergence can be found 
in each case'? One hopes that most or all of these divergences will turn out 
to be explainable as consequences of other semantic or syntactic characteris­
tics of natural languages, and the double-marking system should serve as a 
temporary framework for discovering these. If however, some syntactic NPI 
licensing contexts turn out to be "grammaticized" variants of 1M licensing, 
then no superior format may every exist for describing these than one of this 
kind . 
Note that some basic assumptions of categorial grammar are preserved: 
both syntactic and logical polarity properties will have to be projected "lexi­
cally" , i .e . from (lexical) categories,  without general constraints over kinds of 
syntactic structures per se, but with function/argument organization always 
implici t .  
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As  a first illustration of this framework, I formulate the NPI theory of 
Ladusaw ( 1 979) (and approximately that in Dowty ( 1 993) ) ,  i .e. "irreversible" 
syntactic NPI-licensing:9 
( 52 )  Words in general are entered in one of  two category sets: 
Polarity-Preservers: Polarity-Reversers: { AtIB= } A: IB-:' [A:� /B=l AIRB_ =def =def AlB 
except for: 
NPls: PPls: 
The notation introduced for names of category sets is intended to reflect the 
defaults that (i) montonicity preservation is the default over monotonicity re­
versal ; ( i i ) whether syntactic polarity is preserved or reserved is ,  by default ,  
determined by logical polarity (presered vs. reversed) ,  i .e . the category must 
otherwise be explicitly marked; ( iii ) an expression can occur in either positive 
or negative polarities (both logical and syntactic varieties) unless marked oth­
erwise. An indirect consequence of these defaults is that syntactic polarity will 
typically match logical polarity except for expressions in the scope of a func­
tor that has explicitly introduced a divergence. The category of independent 
sentences is, naturally, st . 
4 . 2  Describing Classes o f  Words/Environments t hat 
Affect Licensing D ifferentially 
For another application, we turn to a kind of NPI "Island" , an environment 
that never allows NPIs to licensing from outside-namely the "Manner-of­
Speaking" verbs , illustrated below along with a category assignment that will 
give them this behavior : 
(53 )  a. Sue whispered ( shouted, murmured, etc. ) that armadillos were ap­
proaching. 
b. *Sue whispered ( shouted, murmured, etc. ) that any armadillos were 
approaching. 
91  enclose the third category on the right in brackets simply because this would have to be 
the category of a ! M  expression occurring inside the scope of two more !M expressions, and 
while 1 know of no reason to rule this possibility out , my attempts to construct sentences 
with three !M expressions and determine their embedded NP1-licensing properties are a 
shaky basis for claiming this category is needed. 
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c. *Sue didn 't whisper (shout , murmur, etc . )  that any armadillos were 
approaching. 
d .  Preserv. : {��j�� } =def A/B+ Revers. : {�;j�t} =def A/RB+ 
�/� - + 
This case is a good candidate for a potential semantic explanation of the li­
censing failure, to be sure. NPIs are not licensed inside 1M reports of quoted 
speech acts ( cf. Mary didn 't say that John ate anything vs. *Mary didn't say, 
"John ate anything " ) ,  and these verbs have meanings that are connected, un­
mistakably, with such a report , both because their meaning involves describing 
the auditory properties of the speech act as well as its content , and because of 
other syntactic characteristics shared with quote complements (e.g. resistance 
to WH-extraction ) .  
Negative Concord languages also provide examples of islands t o  concord 
licensing. Whereas English allows NPIs to be licensed inside a relative clause, 
most American English NC dialects do no allow concord in this position. This 
restriction is all the more noteworthy, because certain NC dialects exist which 
do, however, license concord here. A often-cited example from such an excep­
tional NC dialect is (54) from Labov ( 1 972) : 
(54) Ain't no cat can't get in no coop. 
Lit. : ' (There) ain't no cat (that) can 't get in no coop' 
Actually means in this dialect: "There isn't a cat that can get in a 
coop. "  
As Labov notes , such examples sound bizarre or unintelligible even to speakers 
of English who have passive knowledge of the more prevalent NC English 
dialects .  A category assignment for a relative pronoun that (assuming as in 
many recent categorial analyses that relative clauses and their "gaps" can be 
treated simply as  of  category S/NP) i s  (55) 
(55) that ( Most NC dial . )  
that (Rare NC dial . )  
{ (CNI,\CNt)/ (S/NP):j: } 
(CN::\CN::)/ (S/N P)+ 
=def (CN\CN)/ (S/NP)+ { (CNt\CNt)/ (S/NP):j: } 
(CN:: \CN::)/ (S/N P): 
=def (CN\CN)/ (S/NP) 
As mentioned earlier , Romance NC languages, unlike American English 
NC dialects ,  allow true double negation readings in many cases , so that many 
sentences with two negative-marked constituents are ambiguous between a NC 
and a double-negation reading, such as French sentences like this one: 
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(56 ) Personne n'a rien dit 
( i )  "Nobody said anything" 
( i i )  "Nobody said nothing" ( = "Everybody said something" ) 
The double-marking system (unlike the analysis of N C  presented earlier) offers 
a way of analyzing such cases-in fact , they would sharing the properties of 
'pure' NC languages (that the 'same' morphemes serve simultaneously as ! M  
functors and also as simply indicators that their argument i s  in  a ! M  context , 
without denoting a montonicity-reversing functions themselves) with the prop­
erties of NPI-licensing in English (namely, "irreversible" syntactic licensing) .  
This is accomplished by giving such words this sort of  dual categorization: 
( 5 7 )  
{ 
Category: 
A+IB-+ -
A: IB! 
A':.. IB':. 
Interpretation: 
} =def AIRB_ ! M  
=def A_IB_ TM 
By assigning negative words with ! M  interpretation10 the first category 
set , including the category A:I B! not used in N C  languages for ! M  expres­
sions earlier, we allow it to occur embedded under another genuine negative 
morpheme and yield a logically double negative reading. With TM interpreta­
tions , negative words occur not in a a category A-I  B- as before, indicating 
a logically !M context , but in category A_ I B_ , they indicate perhaps that 
their argument is logically !M or perhaps only that it is C-commanded by a 
negative trigger ( i .e. in double-negation sentences) .  
Finally, we can observe that the double-marking system turns out t o  allow 
a description of the constraint , first observed by Linebarger ( 1 980) ,  on NPI 
licensing created by the intervention of certain quantifiers between trigger and 
NPI (in her terms, a sub-case of the Immediate Scope Constraint ) :  whereas 
(58a) allows the reading (58b) (among other readings, perhaps) , the parallel 
example ( 58c) with a NPI does not . Similarly, (58d) is grammatical , but 
( 58d ) is not ; in both cases it is the intervention of the determiner every that 
is responsible for the difference: 
(58 )  a. Sue didn't read every book to a student 
b . .... o ( 'v'x : book (x ) ) (3y : student (y ) ) [read(Sue , x , y )] 
c. Sue didn't read every book to any student 
d. Sue didn't say Sam caught any armadillos 
e. *Sue didn't say everybody caught any armadillos 
I OTo be precise . with anti-additive interpretations ; I do not address in this paper the 
question of a logic for anti-additive functions ; cf. however Kas ( 1 993) 
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This behavior is captured if we make this category assignment for every: l1 
( 59 ) every is assigned to: (S-:. / V  P; ) /CN� =deJ (A\B+)/RC_ 
{ (st/V P: ) /CN� } 
[( S�/Vpn/CN?] 
4 . 3  A Syntactic Perseverance Hypothesis 
One benefit of using the double-marking system to investigate divergences 
between logical and syntactic polarity context is the possibility of observing 
relationships between the two that might go unnoticed in studies where seman­
t ics and syntax and not examined side-by-side in this way. Here is one possible 
example. Comparison of the case of "unexpected" licensing of NPIs (double 
1M context) with this last case of "unexpected" blocking of NPI  licensing 
( Immediate Scope Constraint ) reveals a a parallel : 
( 60) doesn't : { VP:/VP� } VP�/VP:! { (SUVP:)/CN� } every: (S-:./V P; )/CN:! 
In both cases , the "-" -marked (result ) category differs from the expected one 
in that the syntactic polarity feature on one (or more) argument category(ies) 
i s ,  instead , the same as the syntactic feature on the corresponding "+" -marked 
( result )  category (which is the only other choice in a binary system, to be 
sure ) :  this feature is the V P:! for doesn 't , but not only do we find "-" for 
the C N argument of every but also "+" for its V P argument . One might 
wonder, in other words, whether the quantifier intervention constraint and 
the irreversibility of NPI licensing exist ultimately for the same reason. Both 
don't and every are of course polarity reversers (for one argument) .  Perhaps for 
some reason connected with parsing complexities of 1M functors , the syntactic  
polarity marking of  the TM case "perseveres" in the syntactic polarity of the 
1M case, rather than reversing as does the logical polarity: 
( 6 1 ) "Syntactic Perseverance " hypothesis: 
I 'h d '  { At!  B� } n ar cases , A: / Bg is replaced by: 
To be sure, one would want further motivations for tying these two cases to­
gether before concluding that this is the proper kind of explanation for them­
for example, finding further instances of "perseverance" . Specifically, we would 
look for cases , besides every ,  of binary functors that are 1M for one argument , 
TM for the other . Though such cases are rare, not every may be one. At least 
Barker ( 1 991 ) as well as Hoeksema ( 1 986) have discussed the monotonicity 
and licensing properties of not every; these are complicated by the question 
1 1  As before, the brackets and question marks merely indicate obscure licensing possibilities 
whose properties are hard to verify empirically 
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of the proper constituent structure of a NP like not every student, and quite 
possibly more than one exists. However, if one possible structure has not ev­
ery as a complex determiner (whether it i s  a lexical or complex phrasal unit 
is immaterial here) , then it definitely follows from its semantics that it must 
be TM for its first (eN ,  or Restriction) argument , 1M (VP, or nuclear scope) 
argument , just the converse of every .  This would predict the reverse distribu­
tion of NPls in the two arguments from that of every ,  and indeed both B arker 
and Hoeksema report judgments consistent with this possibility, such as: 
( 62 )  a .  *Not every child with any sense stole some candy. 
b .  Not every child ever stole any candy. (Barker, 1 99 1 ) 
If not every is a 'hard' case, the Syntactic Perseverance hypothesis predicts its 
category should be, unexpectedly, not (SjRVP)jCN or (SjRVP_ )jCN but 
( SjRV P_ /CN+ ) (to use the default notation introduced above ) .  That is , that 
when embedded under a 1M functor, i ts  category-schema instance must be 
S: /RVP"! ) /CN+. ,  so it should be a "barrier" to licensing of NPls within its 
Restriction argument from a higher 1M trigger ( as every is a barrier for its 
nuclear scope) while being an irreversible licenser of NPls within its nuclear 
scope. Unfortunately, this prediction is extremely hard to test . The judgments 
reported above by Barker and Hoeksema are already not overwhelmingly clear 
for some speakers, and testing the perseverance hypothesis requires embedding 
such sentences into a matrix clause with its own negation or other 1M trigger 
(for it is a quirk of not every that it must occur in subject position ) ;  even 
for the most natural-sounding examples I can construct , most speakers balk 
at trying to parse them at all even without NPls, much less differentiate NPI 
licensing in different positions. Hence I omit them here. Hopefully, other ways 
to test the perseverance hypothesis may someday come to light . 
4 . 4  S ummary of Observed Polarity D ivergences 
With a system of categories that allows any functor four potentially distinct 
polarity markings for each functor categories (d. Ap/ B�) there are 24 (=16) 
distinct polarity possibilities, and with assignments of items to sets of polarity­
marked subcategories, the number of polarity possibilities grows to the power 
set of this set-seemingly an embarrassingly rich set of options.  Of the various 
kinds of polarity mismatches discussed ( and speculated about) here, however, 
only the following eight types of category are needed, when the defaults i ntro­
duced above are employed : 
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(63 )  
Default Name:  
( i ) 
( i ia ) 
( i ib )  
( ii i )  
( iv )  
(v )  
(v i )  
( vii ) 
(viii ) 
Cat. Set: Use:  
T M functors 
! M funct 's (in NC langs . )  
! M funct 's (in NPI langs . )  
NPIs 
PPIs 
NPI "Islands" 
every 
"N-words" , Engl . NC,  no...,..., 
"N-words" , Rom. NC,...,...,OK 
( Here, I use 0: and f3 as variables over {+, - } ,  with - 0:  indicating the opposite 
value of 0: . ) Though I have listed every separately, it is of course the com­
bination of a NPI polarity island (v) with a NPI-lang.-type reversing functor 
( i ib ) .  "Pure" NC languages, like American NC English dialects ,  would not 
require the separate syntactic polarity marking at all except for their islands 
to embedding polarity licensing such as relative clauses . 
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